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4KEY FINDINGS
• Local peace agreements are difficult to define and to de-
lineate from the regional and national level. In many cases, 
they result from long-lasting traditions of conflict manage-
ment and customary legal processes. They are not a new 
phenomenon. Still, the number of written and publicly avai-
lable local peace agreements is increasing, which provides 
greater visibility of their role and relationship to both local 
conflict and national peace processes.
• Compared to national-level agreements, local peace ag-
reements are considerably shorter and issue-centred. They 
deal with a wide variety of contextualised topics around the 
predominant aim of managing local patterns of armed con-
flict and violence. In their variety, local peace agreements 
represent the diversity but also the splintered nature and 
patchiness of what is contemporary armed conflict.
• The actors involved in local peace agreements differ from 
peace negotiations at the national and international level. 
Besides armed factions, community representatives, villa-
gers, women’s groups, and other sectors such as business 
are involved in negotiations. Traditional leaders, faith-based 
groups, and humanitarian actors are the most common 
mediators in these processes. Overall, while they deal with 
smaller geographic areas and populations than national 
peace processes, they are often broader in terms of the actor 
groups involved.
• But many of these groups wear multiple ‘hats’, and have 
direct or indirect relationships with state and non-state 
armed actors, as local battalions, mayors of municipalities, 
members of national reconciliation commissions, or bodies 
such as churches, which may also have a national presence.
• Local peace agreements appear in different conflict con-
texts. They occur in ongoing large-scale armed conflict as 
an outcome of local and regional conflict management ini-
tiatives, such as in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan 
or South Sudan; in the aftermath of national-level peace or 
ceasefire deals, such as in the Philippines, Nepal or Myan-
mar; or in generally fragile situations addressing regional 
conflict dynamics, such as in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, the Central African Republic, Pakistan or in Kenya.
• It is possible to roughly distinguish between six types of 
local peace agreements: 
(1) local ceasefires and truces, either between armed factions 
or localised truces between armed groups and state actors; (2) 
efforts of local conflict management about, for instance, gra-
zing rights, migration routes, or the settlement of inter-com-
munity disputes; (3) humanitarian agreements, often mediated 
by humanitarian actors about relief access and the joint use 
of basic infrastructures such as roads, water, or electricity; (4) 
peace agreements in the closer sense, for instance, aiming at 
establishing a local peace process or ‘islands of peace’; (5) 
‘city deals’ which address particular aspects of armed fighting 
within city boundaries; and (6) agreements attempting to at-
tach hold-out groups in particular localities to a national-level 
settlement.1 
• Implementation of local peace agreements is often linked to 
existing local legitimacy structures and people who exercise 
some type of public authority. Nevertheless, implementation 
also depends on a favourable national and international con-
text. Local agreements are often short-term in focus, which 
means that the production of an agreement itself can be a 
significant milestone in what might be called implementation 
because it marks a restoration of relationships. What is un-
derstood as the implementation phase of comprehensive peace 
deals or ceasefire agreements at the national level is not the 
same at the level of local peace agreements. At the local level, 
agreements are often less about a set of commitments to be 
complied with, and more about a joint statement as to conflict 
realities and how to change them.
• Local peace agreements rarely attempt to address what are 
understood as the main fault lines of the national-level conflict. 
They occur due to the existence of subnational or local conflict. 
While it can be tempting for donors to view support for local 
processes as an alternative to a stalled national peace process, 
attempts to link them or scale them up to produce a national 
level peace process prove challenging. 
• Local conflicts, however, are deeply enmeshed with the natio-
nal conflict and so play important roles in forestalling national 
conflict. Negotiations at the local level, therefore, bring local 
forms of peace to the fore, contribute to confidence in the na-
tional process, and manage local violence that has the capacity 
to destabilise or re-spark the national process.
• Not all local agreements which ostensibly focus on reducing 
conflict are about ‘peace’. Some are agreed to create new 
5alliances, to reduce conflict in one direction and increase it 
in another. The impact and meaning of a local agreement 
vary depending on context. Local agreements may, however, 
play crucial de-escalation roles with relation to national 
conflict, and therefore be indirectly supportive of national 
peace efforts.
• The decision of how to engage and invest in local peace 
agreements by external actors needs to be taken on a ca-
se-by-case basis, even within countries. Technical support, 
political recognition, and funding can have supportive roles if 
done in a contextualised way. At the same time, over-funding 
or over-burdening with expectations may hamper or even 
de-legitimise such efforts. Sensible engagement needs to 
accept the limitations inherent to local peacemaking and 
withhold from trying to do too much. A careful approach, 
which understands that even within country local agree-
ments of several different types may arise, is particularly 
advisable when negotiations at the national level are stalled 
and supporting local peace agreements appears like a viable 
alternative strategy.
____________________________________________________
1 Christine Bell, Robert Forster, and Laura Wise, ‘Big Peace, Little 
Piece? Local Peace Agreements and National Peace Processes’, 
forthcoming. 
6Recent years have seen a proliferation of local and sub-na-
tional peace agreements negotiated and signed in conflict 
settings as different as Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Afghanis-
tan, South Sudan, Kenya, Nepal, Libya, and Somalia. Such 
agreements are not a new phenomenon. Local truces and 
agreements on humanitarian access were already being 
signed in considerable numbers during the wars in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Croatia in the early 1990s. In recent 
years, local negotiations in violent conflict seem to be be-
coming increasingly better documented and formalised. 
This development may be caused by the comparably easy 
availability of electronic means of documentation and com-
munication, even in remote areas.
Local peace processes and resultant agreements have also 
gained more attention from national, regional, and interna-
tional actors, in part due to their increased visibility. Interest 
in local agreements is also driven by the changing dynamics 
of conflict and peace. Structural shifts at the international 
level that result in a decreasing likelihood of comprehensive 
peace processes at the national level are one such factor.
The model of the traditional ‘peace process’ at the national 
level assumes the existence of a state actor who is inter-
nationally recognised, and one (or more) armed opposition 
groups. Often, however, conflicts are more complex. Con-
flicts such as those in Libya and the Central African Repu-
blic (CAR) may be understood as contests about the control 
of the central state. They involve armed organisations with 
limited geographic reach and small localised groups who 
never had political or military ambitions at the national 
level. These actors come together in various short-term 
alliances to achieve particular objectives.
Other conflicts, such as in South Sudan, evolve from a 
complex interrelation between the national level and a 
variety of localised conflict settings that are largely based 
on context-dependent fault lines. These localised conflicts 
range from fighting between splinter factions and armed 
groupings to cattle raiding and revenge killings, whereby 
distinctions between these different types of violence may 
not be clear-cut. Another example for the close interrela-
tion between a political conflict at the national level and 
localised conflicts is the post-election violence in Kenya in 
2008. Whilst provoked by a disputed national-level election, 
it also occurred in highly localised forms. Local agreements, 
therefore, seem to play an important role across diverse 
conflict, in ‘untangling’ forms of conflict, that often opera-
te as complex local-national-transnational-international 
conflict systems.
Against this background, the Political Settlements Research 
Programme (PSRP) organised two Joint Analysis Workshops 
in October and November 2019 focusing on local peace 
agreements, their negotiation, the actors involved, and 
their impact and modes of implementation. The workshops 
were held in cooperation with The British Academy (BA) and 
the Rift Valley Institute (RVI). The first workshop in London 
focused on conflicts in Asia and the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region. The second event in Nairobi discus-
sed local peace agreements and processes in Eastern and 
Central Africa and the Horn. In total, over 100 participants 
from 25 countries involved with or researching on local 
peace agreements contributed to thematic discussions. 
The workshops discussed four guiding questions:
(1) What defines local peace processes? What sorts of ‘local 
agreement’ are signed in peace processes, and why? Who 
initiates the negotiations and what type of actor is involved? 
What do these agreements typically include, what is their 
particular character? 
(2) To what extent can we understand common practices? 
Are these practices unique and locally rooted in a specific 
culture of peacemaking?
(3) How do these processes relate or sit towards the na-
tional and the international level? Is there any (positive or 
antagonistic) relation to a national peace process? What 
transitional landscape between conflict and peace do they 
create or contribute to?
(4) When and how have external actors engaged in such 
negotiations and with what consequences? What challen-
ges do they pose for normative actors and institutions (for 
example, in the realm of human rights)?
This report provides a summary of the key debates and 
outcomes from both workshops. In doing so, the report 
aims at presenting the richness of the provided examples 
with a comparative analysis. Where no specific references 
to certain points or arguments are given, they are based on 
interventions by workshop participants which were made 
under Chatham House rules. Yet, the local specificities of 
local peace agreements result in a considerable diversity, 
so, in several instances, examples are not illustrative of 
broader practices but can only stand for themselves.
INTRODUCTION
7Defining local peace agreements is a challenging endeavour. 
The term ‘local’ in itself is a matter of debate since it can 
refer to the spatial dimension, a specific web of relationships 
as arising at the local level, the types of actors involved, 
or the scope of the goals associated with an agreement. 
All of these possible definitions of ‘local’ play a role when 
contrasting a ‘local’ peace agreement with agreements at 
the national or international level. The separate character 
of the conflict that needs to be settled best captures the 
distinct character of local agreements across contexts, as 
distinct from the contestation at the national level across 
contexts. This distinctiveness also applies when such agree-
ments explicitly refer to the national level or include state 
actors – as many do. Concerning the spatial dimension, 
‘local’ agreements do not just refer to remote or rural areas 
but are commonly negotiated in urban spaces as well.2  It 
is not about remoteness, it is about the particularities of a 
given locality and its conflict setting. 
Finally, the term ‘peace’ proves to be challenging as well. 
Local peace agreements diverge from traditional ‘peace ag-
reements’ since they often do not aim for sustainable conflict 
transformation but mitigate or manage armed violence at a 
local level. Striking examples for this ambition are found in 
Syria, where armed groups in control of certain areas agree 
to sign a ceasefire and do so with the main aim of joining 
forces and collaboratively fighting a common enemy.3  
Another issue is the overlap between local peace agree-
ments and documents embedded in customary law and 
traditional methods of conflict management. What can 
appear to observers as an isolated and innovative approach 
might indeed have a long history, formality and regularity 
specific to the context. In some regions, there may also be 
considerable incentives to not document processes and to 
rely on oral traditions of peacemaking, which is discussed in 
more detail later in the report. Peace at the local level has a 
profoundly different meaning compared with peace is con-
ceptualised at the national, regional, or international levels. 
Experiences from a variety of contexts suggest that concepts 
of societal friendship, community, and respect for laws and 
customs can be part of what peace means for local people. 
Peace is always embedded in place. It is materialised in the 
everyday.4  But defining a conflict as ‘local’ is nonetheless 
a political decision. Actors may be able to generate poli-
tical or economic gains by strategically confining conflict 
management to a subnational or local level, for instance, 
by avoiding power-sharing arrangements at a larger scale.
Even though agreements can be defined as predominantly 
local, they interplay with other layers of conflict and pea-
cemaking. Most local conflict settings are interrelated to 
national and global issues and involve actors from diverse 
arenas. They are entangled in frictious, both vertical and 
asymmetrical power relations that evolve when interna-
tional, national and local discourses and fault lines meet.5 
Outcomes of local peace agreements are, thus, often hybrid 
and situated across the local, regional, national and inter-
national spheres.6 
The stances towards writing down agreements differ across 
contexts. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and, to a lesser extent, 
Kenya, some local peace processes have been heavily bu-
reaucratised and well-documented. Written agreements 
can be preferable for some since oral agreements could 
die with the people who reached them, risking the loss of 
any gains if leaders are killed, or for the next generation. 
A written and agreed outcome can also support reaching 
a shared understanding and avoiding discrepancies due to 
diverse interpretations of what had been said during the 
negotiations. Often, a mutually agreed list of ‘grievances’ can 
itself stand as a form of mutual acknowledgement that is as 
important as the points actually agreed as to address them. 
In South Sudan, church-led processes often adopt a form of 
documentation that stands between a written agreement and 
the minute of a process of inter-communal reconciliation. 
In other regions, oral agreements may be more significant 
than written agreements, as parties may be sceptical of 
the utility in writing agreements, or be distrustful of writing 
things down. Stakeholders tend to retain the information in 
their memories, and take the view that only ‘outsiders’ write 
down, whilst ‘insiders’ know and understand the content of 
the negotiation. Oral agreements that are negotiated face-
to-face may, therefore, be seen as more effective than, and 
preferable to, written deals. Indeed, such local agreement 
texts as exist in regions such as the Middle East and North 
Africa that read more as ‘minutes’ of an agreement that 
exists orally, rather than a set of actual commitments made 
in writing. 
In many processes, the final text of the agreement is not 
reflective of all the points agreed (not only discussed) during 
a negotiation. This absence can stem from the reluctance 
1. FRAMING ‘LOCAL’ PEACE AGREEMENTS 
8to put specific issues on paper, such as agreements around 
the distribution of smuggling profits, trafficking of goods 
and people, and distribution of protection rackets. It should 
therefore not be assumed that the available written text 
is necessarily a reflection of all agreed steps forward, or 
that an isolated incidence of a written deal means that it is 
not supported by or embedded within a framework of oral 
agreements. 
____________________________________________________
2  Annika Björkdahl, 2012, ‘Urban Peacebuilding’, Peacebuilding, 1:2, 
207-221; Mary Kaldor and Saskia Sassen, eds, 2020, Cities at War: 
Global Insecurity and Urban Resistance. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
3 For more on the different actor permutations across local peace 
processes in Syria, see Juline Beaujouan, 2020, ‘PA-X Local: Note on 
Local Peace Processes in the Syrian Conflict’, Edinburgh: Political 
Settlements Research Programme, https://www.peaceagreements.
org/publication58
4 Roger Mac Ginty and Pamina Firchow, 2016, ‘Top-down and bot-
tom-up narratives of peace and conflict’, Politics, 36:3, 308-323.
5 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, 2005, Friction: An Ethnography of Global 
Connection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
6 See Roberto Belloni, 2012, ‘Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence 
and Significance’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and 
International Organizations, 18:1, 21-38; Oliver P. Richmond, 2015, 
‘The dilemmas of a hybrid peace: Negative or positive?’, Cooperation 
and Conflict, 50:1, 50-68.
9Local peace agreements are highly diverse and contextua-
lised. They contain regional and local specificities of how 
conflict is understood and managed. However, they also 
show remarkable similarities, especially in their written 
appearance. Local peace agreements occur in most count-
ries with ongoing armed conflict. Their specific regularity 
and significance reflect the character of the conflict. Local 
peace agreements have particularly come to light as an 
important way to address conflict in strongly regionalised 
conflict settings such as in Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and South 
Sudan. Other instances with a high prevalence of local and 
subnational agreements are settings where armed conflict 
and violence are confined to parts of the country, albeit 
connected to wider country instabilities and fault-lines, such 
as in Pakistan, Kenya, and the Philippines. Sub-national 
agreements can also be found in otherwise state-dominated 
processes like in Myanmar or Nepal, where they have been 
used to try to create state-local agreements with very small 
armed factions. Even within these contexts, however, local 
peace agreements tackle a wide variety of topics and fulfil 
a range of different functions.
There is a noticeable distinction between the content of 
negotiations in local peace agreements and the issues that 
predominate at the national level. Assessing the written 
agreements available in the PA-X Peace Agreements Data-
base 7, these particularities are mainly references to ritual 
processes and prayer, to acknowledge local grievances, to 
address cattle rustling, banditry and looting; and to facilitate 
the handover of wanted persons or the lifting of societal in-
group protection for people responsible for intercommunal 
violence to enable criminal process or compensation to the 
communities they wronged. 
Land issues are another subject frequently addressed in local 
peace agreements. In Mindanao and Pakistan, land issues 
are especially relevant as they are closely connected to the 
overarching conflict and, therefore, not only potential trigger 
points for escalations at a larger scale but are also difficult to 
settle. In Nigeria, Kenya, South Sudan, or the Central African 
Republic (CAR), pastoral conflicts related to land issues such 
as issues related to migration routes and grazing rights are 
regularly referenced in local peace agreements. 
Further topics include sexual and gender-based violen-
ce, cross-border violence, business-related issues such 
as free movement and market access, the use of shared 
infrastructures, humanitarian relief, community conflicts 
arising from landlord-tenant relationships, religiously-fra-
med conflicts, and issues surrounding armed groups and 
their behaviour, especially illegal taxation and checkpoints. 
Several agreements aim to forge alliances or facilitate tac-
tical surrenders, which raises challenges in defining these 
as ‘peace’ agreements. Justice mechanisms also feature 
prominently, although in a way that often diverges from how 
justice is negotiated at the national level. Such provisions 
can be related to social cover where the protection of the 
tribe would be lifted for people who committed crimes or 
financial compensation paid to victims or heirs of a victim 
under Islamic or customary law. 
The empirical comparison shows that the predominant 
overarching function of local peace agreements is to stop 
armed violence, at least temporarily. This functionality ex-
plains why many of these agreements take the form of cea-
sefires, truces, and cessation-of-hostilities arrangements. 
Topics like the withdrawal of heavy weapons, humanitarian 
access, the return of displaced people, and prisoner ex-
change underscore this modality of conflict management. 
Such agreements do not aim at building sustainable peace 
or addressing overarching conflict fault lines. Instead, they 
produce an environment of normalcy that allows farmers 
to cultivate their farms and children to go to school and 
facilitating displaced persons to return to their homes in a 
more secure environment. It appears that these elements 
are deemed more straightforward to achieve written com-
mitments on than a form of all-encompassing peace.
____________________________________________________
7  Bell, Christine, Sanja Badanjak, Juline Beaujouan, Margherita 
Distrotti, Tim Epple, Robert Forster, Robert Wilson, and Laura 
Wise (2020). PA-X Local Peace Agreements Database and Dataset, 
Version 1. www.peaceagreements.org/lsearch
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Modogashe Declaration III
ANNEX II. Maikona and Walda Peace Declaration
Local peace agreement example
Maikona and Walda Peace Declaration, signed 28 July 2009
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Negotiations over peace and conflict are complex processes 
taking place across various arenas in parallel. It is often 
difficult to clearly define a beginning and an endpoint of 
a peace process. Especially in discussions about external 
support, the question of ownership arises quickly, not only 
referring to the ownership of the process but also of the sub-
sequent agreement and its implementation. This challenge 
is particularly prevalent in local peace processes, where 
mediators often have to invoke various forms of traditional 
legitimacy, for example, customary approaches when trying 
to achieve desired outcomes. 
National or international involvement has a role to play in 
supporting local peace negotiations. This role is not straight-
forward, however. For instance, financial and technical 
support can undermine the legitimacy of local peace pro-
cesses by inadvertently making actors or mediators appear 
as supported by foreign agencies or as only being interested 
in their own political or financial gain. At the same time, 
even highly localised efforts of conflict management and 
peacemaking are ‘glocalised’. Most stakeholders involved in 
the negotiation of local peace agreements have personal or 
political relations to actors at the national level. Many of the 
international actors supporting such efforts are not only well 
connected in the region, but also work through local staff 
who have grown up and live in the area. A clear distinction 
between what is local, national, or international, therefore, 
is rarely clear-cut. 
The roles of urgency and necessity are also vital to unders-
tanding when and why local peace processes emerge. As 
one workshop participant working in a sub-Saharan African 
context noted: 
The origins of the local peace processes were based on the 
notion that the people had to solve their problems locally be-
cause they could not wait for the government to arrive. At the 
local level, they have a better understanding of these issues 
and waiting for government intervention would take too long 
risking an escalation of violence.
Several examples emphasise this argument. In South Su-
dan, religious actors play an influential role in initiating 
peace processes. Notably, the South Sudanese Council of 
Churches (SSCC) is substantially involved in local peace 
processes across the country. The Presbyterian Church has 
also facilitated several processes, in particular around the 
Equatorian town of Yei. The church as a community organ 
has considerable knowledge of what is happening on the 
ground because church leaders often stay in their localities, 
even throughout periods of intense fighting. This enduran-
ce contributes to their legitimacy within communities and 
among armed actors. Sometimes, church actors also adopt 
a more passive approach by initiating negotiations but then 
not directly participating in it, apart from providing trans-
port or contact with the army in order to provide security 
guarantees. 
Traditional authorities are another influential actor. Work-
shop participants confirmed the essential role of traditional 
leaders, but also local researchers as those documenting 
the processes for local peacemaking in eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). In CAR, the UN-mission MINUSCA 
monitors the ongoing conflict and attempts identifying indivi-
duals with leadership qualities and trying to provide capacity 
building in order to support local peacemaking efforts. When 
negotiations are held, MINUSCA is commonly charged with 
the responsibility of sharing the outcomes with the affected 
communities to disseminate results and implications.
This engagement underscores the role multilateral support 
can play in peace negotiations at the local level. MINUSCA, 
as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Soma-
lia (UNISOM), are among the first UN-missions that have 
strategically engaged in local peacemaking. This engage-
ment contrasts earlier attempts of relying on more ad-hoc 
negotiations hosted by strategically located peacekeepers, 
as was often the case during the UNPROFOR mission in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this practice is becoming 
more common among other UN-missions, such as the 
increasing attention being paid by UNAMA to ongoing local 
peace initiatives in Afghanistan. 
3. INITIATING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
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The distinction between parties and mediators can often be 
tricky to assess. Sometimes the roles become identifiable 
when a written local peace agreement is reached, since 
signatories may list the capacity in which they are endor-
sing the agreed points. However, the composition of actors 
can be incredibly diverse and frequently raises questions 
regarding the inclusivity, legitimacy and sustainability of 
processes. Individuals taking part in negotiations may wear 
different ‘hats’, often representing one of the multiple iden-
tities that they have, and sometimes change their role as 
a process moves forward. Such multiplicity of roles raises 
the importance of engaging with actors’ reflections of their 
position in a particular process, rather than relying on ex-
ternal perceptions. 
Military and security sector
In the majority of armed conflicts, the national military re-
presents a key player at all possible levels. In South Sudan 
or the DRC, armed groups being part of or being affiliated 
with the national armed forces are a substantial part of lo-
cal peace negotiations, which is a requirement in order for 
them to succeed. Myanmar and Nepal have seen a number 
of what might be called ‘mop-up agreements’, which are 
permanent ceasefires between state actors and localised 
armed groups for pacifying areas of the country that the 
national-level peace agreement could not fully reach. 
These agreements have largely succeeded in including 
local armed groups in a settlement at the national level. 
They have also created local settlements that resulted in a 
decrease in armed violence in the region. Especially in My-
anmar, these processes progress with strong involvement of 
the national security sector. In Nepal, they evolved as part of 
a national initiative to enable free and fair elections, which 
incentivised the government to invest in the resolution of 
local conflicts in order to hold credible elections throughout 
the whole country.
In Pakistan and Yemen, local agreements tend to focus on 
the movement of armed actors in particular territories. 
Such agreements are brokered between villages and their 
armed representatives and parts of the national armed for-
ces or other armed organisations. These practices show the 
fragile role the nation-state plays in some of these settings 
vis-à-vis ‘strong societies’. 8 
Traditional authorities
Traditional authorities, such as elders and tribal leaders, play a 
considerable role in local peacemaking, especially in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa and the MENA region. In regions with established 
tribal structures, tribes are not only involved in local peace 
processes as actors, but the tribal structure itself severs as a 
mechanism with legal implications. In Jordan, the tribal judi-
ciary is a habitual way of local conflict management, which deal 
with dispute cases regarding personal honour, women, revenge 
killings and murder, as well as with local politics. A common 
challenge is the role some tribal leaders play in national politics. 
In such cases, their involvement may become linked to the inte-
rest to get (re-)elected or appointed to governmental positions. 
In Yemen, the nature of the involvement of tribal chiefs varies 
depending on the localities. In Ma’rib, the predominantly tribal 
nature of the area means that tribal sheikhs from the same 
tribe across three branches are heavily involved in local peace 
processes. In Taiz, in contrast, the key actors tend to be societal 
leaders, women leaders and activists. In cases where these 
groups are not embedded in the tribal dynamics, tensions 
evolve. Even if local peacemaking is initiated by parts of civil 
society, it cannot succeed by working against the predominant 
social dynamics at play. Understanding these dynamics and 
taking them into account, therefore, is a crucial task.
In Somalia’s clan-based conflict structure, the role of clan re-
presentatives in political power-sharing is central to local peace 
processes. The main actors involved are tribal chiefs, often in a 
double role as clan elders and formal community representa-
tives. One of the challenges in these processes is sequencing. 
Often, the ongoing conflict has resulted in intra-clan conflicts 
that need to be resolved before negotiations between two clans 
can start in a meaningful way.
In South Sudan, the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) is currently en-
gaged in research involving chiefs who participated in the 1999 
Wunlit peace agreement that reunified the split Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in locally-based negotiati-
ons. 9  Chiefs played an essential role in bringing the parties 
together and reframing the contestation from an ethnopolitical 
problem between Dinka and Nuer into a national political issue. 
By turning the problem into a political one, it became possible 
to reconcile the ethnopolitical communities. Chiefs were able 
to act as the local agents to the communities and to represent 
their interests in the political negotiation process.
4. THE ACTORS: PARTIES AND MEDIATORS
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In a number of places, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, elders 
still have the authority and power to influence and to legitimise 
local peace negotiations. Elders usually can rely on a robust 
social network and a significant capacity to mobilise. They are 
often the first who engage in local peacemaking, mainly to 
de-escalate tensions or to explore preventive measures. In some 
cases, elders take up responsibilities as mediators; however, 
as negotiations and conflict settings become more complex, 
capacity-related support becomes necessary. Elders tend to rely 
on customary methods of conflict management, such as peace 
conferences lasting several days that do not always result in 
written agreements. Oral agreements have certain advantages 
but can also pose problems in terms of reliability, compliance 
and implementation. 
The role that traditional authorities play in local peacemaking 
processes is not without challenges. One issue is the potential 
reinforcement of existing power imbalances within communities. 
The processes that traditional and customary leaders design are 
not exclusive by design, but broadening processes of inclusion 
mainly depend on the decision-making of traditional authorities.
Community leaders, women, and youth
Community-driven processes that broadly include often mar-
ginalised yet influential groups such as women, young people, 
displaced persons, and persons with disabilities are seemingly 
on the rise. Hybrid methods that use traditional platforms and 
modern means of participation are being trialled to see whether 
hybridity can support the potential of local peace processes. 
In Galkayo, Somalia, the main interlocutors of the process were 
governors, mayors, and representatives of local communities. 
For promoting broader buy-in and process inclusivity, interlo-
cutors facilitated and enhanced community representation. The 
negotiations involved bringing together elders, religious leaders, 
women, youth representatives, and the business sector. The 
process culminated in bringing the relevant decision-makers 
and most of the other relevant stakeholders from the two sides of 
Galkayo together. Thus, the inclusive approach made it possible 
to overcome a preexisting separation of the talks which were 
held separately – one on the Galmudug side and one on the 
Puntland side. The joint negotiations had an immediate impact; 
for instance, militias of both sides removed roadblocks after the 
meetings had started.10 
Women take on a variety of roles in local peace processes, 
ranging from active participation in fighting and liberation 
struggles to acting as representatives of their communities, 
survivors of abuse and violence, and their role as mediators.11 
In many settings, however, women’s participation in local pea-
cemaking is not straightforward. They might not be allowed 
to contribute because of societal inequalities and obstac-
les, or their voice may not be recognised. To respond to this 
challenge, women have utilised existing tribal customs and 
cultural practices in order to instigate or support local peace 
processes. Two such examples are the Wajir peace process 
in north-eastern Kenya, and deliberations across different 
governorates in Yemen.12 Compartmentalisation is another 
challenge since inclusive participation might be organised as 
women organisations discussing especially ‘women-related 
topics’. Such an approach neglects the unique experiences 
women can bring to the negotiation table. As one workshop 
participant highlighted: 
Women understand conflict more than men. Women suffer and 
encourage or discourage men from going into conflict. It is the 
women that can drive the peacebuilding processes.
Participatory and inclusive approaches might still complicate 
peace processes, as one participant raised: 
The inclusion of women and the youth is essential. But it does 
not simplify the process. Those who think that bringing women 
to the table is a quicker route to peace may be disappointed. 
This account relates to the fact that women and youth are not 
necessarily more peaceful and open to political compromise 
than other parts of society. For instance, in some areas of 
South Sudan observations of workshop participants pointed 
towards a more radical and unforgiving stance women have 
taken in negotiations compared to male participants. 
Involving young people is as well turning into a crucial compo-
nent of local peacemaking. This more influential role of youth 
is a result of rationalising their role as potential combatants 
in armed conflicts and of recognising the related threats they 
face, especially forced recruitment and targeted killings. Many 
conflict contexts have a comparably young population, which 
gives the youth a considerable influence on the socio-political 
setting. The examples discussed above, such as in Galkayo, 
Somalia, have shown that youth actors have a structurally 
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important role in mitigating an ongoing violent conflict and 
substantially contribute to the dissemination of negotiation 
results, especially on social media. 
One interesting and possibly unique example of using online 
technologies to broaden buy-in to a local peace agreement is 
the final provision of the Nakuru County Peace Accord, which 
was agreed by the Agikuyu and Kalenjin communities in the 
year 2012. As well as signatories from elders of the affected 
communities, civil society groups and other stakeholders 
within Nakuru county, the agreement invites additional sig-
natures from 
any others, anywhere in Kenya or internationally, who wish 
to acknowledge this Accord and welcome its objectives and 
terms. Signatories in this category may be added at any time 
by procedures to be established by the Elders. People in this 
category may also ‘sign’ via the internet when the Accord web-
site is established.13 
National and local politicians
The role of politicians who hold positions in national instituti-
ons and participate in local peace processes is difficult to as-
sess from the outset. The support of the national level in peace 
processes can be crucial, as it demonstrates and practically 
represents political will. At the same time, national politicians 
tend to utilise their local roots politically, relying strongly on 
them to pursue their interests in the political game at the 
national level. The role and composition of community leaders, 
as well, differ across processes. Community leaders are often 
both elders and government officials at the same time, which 
can support to facilitate a multi-level structure of the peace 
architecture for a local peace agreement. This multiplicity of 
roles underlines the difficulties in drawing a clear line between 
‘national’ and ‘local’ actors. These roles often overlap or even 
change regarding to context and interests at stake.
The negotiation of local peace agreements in South Sudan 
illustrates this challenge. Such efforts are unlikely to be effec-
tive unless they benefit the political elite in what constitutes 
the South Sudanese national political marketplace. If local 
arrangements cut across political interests at the national 
level, the chances are that they are going to be undermined. 
In turn, such agreements are used by local strongmen to 
enhance their political chances at the national level. For local 
peace agreements to hold, forging an alignment between the 
national political elite, the military, and the local leaders of 
armed factions is essential.
The interrelation between the national and local level be-
comes even more challenging when the conflict setting is 
characterised by the lack of a functional central state that can 
project its political and military power beyond the major cities. 
In Libya, after the eruption of the second civil war in 2014, 
local conflicts took a national dimension. As a consequence, 
local conflicts were instrumentalised by national actors. This 
instrumentalisation resulted in local actors taking advantage 
of the power game at the national level and utilised their role 
for gaining resources and support. Local and national inter-
ests thus evolved in a contradicting relationship of perpetual 
mutual reinforcement and undermining.
The perception of the role of local politicians in local peace 
processes differs across contexts. In Iraq, local governors have 
been at the forefront of driving local peace processes. In South 
Sudan, some state governors with strong community relations 
have actively taken up the role to manage tensions and to sup-
port free-movement agreements between the warring parties 
after the revitalised peace agreement, R-ARCSS, was signed in 
late 2018. The decision by state governors to become engaged 
actively in local peace processes has been widely respected 
among communities. In Nakuru, Kenya, community leaders 
requested not to have outside interference from national party 
leaders in order to protect the local peace process from the 
issue of mistrust, because national-level politicians are often 
seen as sources of division, rather than harbingers of unity.
The armed conflict in Somalia develops in a constant clash 
between local and national approaches to political organisa-
tion and statebuilding. Severe challenges arise when the two 
approaches – bottom-up and top-down – collide, especially 
when local powerbrokers aim to influence the national level, 
or national politics attempt to dictate local power settings. 
Similar issues occurred in Syria when the government tried 
to centralise peace processes in a top-down approach through 
the establishment of a peace ministry. As a response, reconci-
liation committees would form at the local level in competition 
with the process at the national level.
The interplay between the national and the local level can 
also yield positive repercussions. By distributing legitimacy 
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and recognition, local peace agreements can become a me-
chanism for mitigating violence and demonstrate success. 
This strategy was applied, for example, in Nepal, where a 
considerable number of agreements in the succession of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement at the national level were 
signed by the peace ministry with local armed groups. In this 
way, both arenas – the national and the local – profited from 
closing the agreement.
In most instances, the national-local-interplay is one of tra-
de-offs and unintended consequences. Government policies 
may have an unforeseen impact on local peacemaking by 
unintentionally favouring some communities vis-à-vis others. 
Efforts of disarmament in situations without a functional 
security apparatus are a constant challenge. While getting 
rid of weapons ostensibly looks like a good idea, it can create 
security dilemmas that increase distrust between communi-
ties, especially in ethnopolitically tense situations. In a pres-
ently ongoing disarmament campaign in Northern Kenya, the 
Turkana are the only ethnopolitical group not included in this 
exercise, perceived to be because they share a long border with 
South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda. This potential insecurity 
results in the perception of the need for armed protection 
which cannot be guaranteed by the national security sector. 
Communities neighbouring the Turkana, however, now are 
fearful of attacks and claim that the government is favouring 
the Turkana over them. 
Churches
Churches play a vital role in the negotiation of many local 
peace agreements. They are often the centre of the community 
with a network that reaches the lowest structure in the village. 
The church is traditionally an institution that people turn to 
in case of disputes. Religious leaders, similarly to elders, are 
therefore among the first to hear about challenges related to 
armed conflict. As a consequence, they become the first to 
take the initiative to raise awareness of a potentially disruptive 
problem. Their tendency to maintain a physical presence in 
areas even during the worst episodes of armed conflict con-
tributes to their legitimacy.
The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) tries to 
push the peace agenda by advocating for the elimination 
of corruption, instituting police reforms, and other positive 
changes. It communicates these grievances shared by local 
communities in press statements and consultations with the 
government. The NCCK also works on projects to help ease 
community conflicts, such as by maintaining a presence in 
areas of the North Rift Valley where cattle rustling is com-
mon. To this aim, the NCCK organises the County Dialogue 
Conferences (CDCs), where communities are brought toge-
ther to look at the issues affecting them directly. Cooperation 
with and the support of external actors is essential, as is the 
collaboration with the NCCK’s Council of Elders. 
One such project involved the creation of a group called ‘the 
women of faith’. This project worked on creating designated 
spaces for each community to talk about issues that were 
especially affecting women. It subsequently brought them 
together to diffuse tensions and build trust. Another pea-
cebuilding project initiated by NCCK with the support of the 
Church of Canada targeted young men in Marakwet, West 
Pokot, and Turkana. The NCCK cooperated with young men 
in forming community platforms in churches and uses them 
to reintroduce and teach traditional peacemaking methods.
In South Sudan, the South Sudanese Council of Churches 
(SSCC) plays a comparably vital role in facilitating and suppor-
ting local peace initiatives. The SSCC has developed an action 
plan for peace which was built on the three pillars of advocacy, 
neutral forum, and reconciliation. In advocacy, the church 
aims to appeal to South Sudanese communities to resolve 
their issues and change prevailing destructive narratives of 
violence, power struggles, and abuse, into ones of settlement 
and reconciliation. A number of projects have already been 
implemented, whereby the success, unsurprisingly given the 
challenging context, remains mixed.
In the Equatoria region of South Sudan, the Evangelical Pres-
byterian Church plays an influential role as a local peace 
broker. In the years since 2015, the surroundings of the city of 
Yei have turned into a stronghold of several so-called ‘hold-out 
groups’ that have not signed the revitalised South Sudanese 
peace agreement (R-ARCSS). The Presbyterian Church is able 
to reach these actors and to engage them in peacemaking, 
which led to the signing of two Yei River State peace agree-
ments.14
Churches are frequently considered to offer a neutral forum 
and a free space to openly discuss the root causes of the war 
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and all that has resulted from it. Such forums open up space 
where actors from all levels can meet to discuss issues in a 
neutral environment that take the form of people-to-people 
community conversations. People are brought together to ex-
plain why they are involved in violence and come up with solu-
tions that are embedded in the local surroundings. In the SSCC 
approach, these conversations should result in reconciliation 
and trauma healing. In South Sudan, faith-based actors have 
traditionally encouraged both victims and perpetrators of the 
violence to speak out as a way of healing. They are the driving 
force behind the community in this reconciliation process. 
The role of church actors is not undisputed. In the South Suda-
nese example, for instance, the substantial amount of external 
funding acquired by the SSCC has raised suspicion by some 
observers that are sceptical regarding the effective use of re-
sources. These critiques confirm the constant contradiction 
between the necessity and the possibly de-legitimising effect 
of international support for local peace mediation.
Civil society, businesses, 
and local peace committees
The role of organised civil society, mainly NGOs, is diverse and 
controversially assessed. On the one hand, NGOs play a vital 
role in research, advisory, and practical support of negotiation 
processes across different regions. Due to their capacity to 
advocate, they are able to create pressure at the local and 
national political level in order to move things forward or to 
attract attention to particular problems. Still, their role was 
put in perspective by workshop contributors. The specific 
modalities of their involvement need to be thoroughly taken 
into account. There can be a tension between individuals and 
traditional leadership structures and organised civil society 
beyond these groups, which is mainly due to the specific con-
textual setting around legitimacy and ownership, and these 
tensions themselves need to be understood as requiring to be 
mediated. The potentially adverse role of international NGOs 
in local negotiation processes has also been raised. As with 
national NGOs, the effectivity of INGOs often relates to their 
ability to recruit and work through local staff that is embedded 
in the respective communities.
Involving business into local peace processes does not appear 
to be a key modality, yet it can yield fruitful results.15  In Somalia, 
local businesses were donating money to resolve the conflict in 
the 1990s. The business sector is also involved in the negotiation 
process in Galkayo, where discussions between business people 
and traders sent a message to actors using forms of violence 
that the violence was unacceptable to the local community. This 
support reflects increasing ownership and long-term thinking.
Local peace process modalities can address these tensions. 
Local peace committees are one modality used to structurally 
involve actors from civil society and the business sector, along-
side traditional authority holders. Peace processes can gain 
from the involvement of these committees in two ways. First, 
these committees structure and formalise inter-communal 
negotiations that broker not just between communities, but 
between constituencies of interest. Second, they can provide a 
bridge between the state and inter-communal agreement. The 
formation of local peace committees evolved as a response to 
the often-frustrating experience of stakeholders involved in local 
peacemaking when their role as a bridge was not recognised, 
and feedback from the national level was lacking.
In Kenya, the local peace committees hence were institutiona-
lised at the national level in the ‘National Steering Committee 
on Peace Building and Conflict Management’ (NSC). According 
to the workshop contribution of one of its representatives, the 
NSC was
borne out of the need to incorporate traditional justice resolution 
mechanisms into the formal legal-judicial system of conflict miti-
gation. The NSC partners with CSOs in order to engender conflict 
sensitivity to development as it has been largely accepted that a 
peaceful, stable and secure society is a prerequisite for sustainable 
development. 
Essentially, the NSC acts as the voice of local peace councils 
and committees at the national level.
Growing concerns among grassroots practitioners stress the 
danger that the NSC could become just another government 
agency run by elites and decoupled from the objectives of pea-
cemaking at the local level. While agreements in the Kenyan 
context traditionally were based on resource-sharing, the NSC 
would have introduced the risk of interference of individual 
career-perspectives. However, without the support of the NSC 
representatives of the communities engaging in the mediation 
process might lack the capacity to negotiate agreements at 
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eye-level with state negotiators, which could undermine com-
munity ownership.
As the NSC’s reference to ‘sustainable development’ indica-
tes, local peace committees, especially in Kenya, are not just 
aiming at resolving conflicts but also at developing a local 
area. In doing so, they fill the gap left by a locally weak state. 
Challenges, thus, often arise when state-level mediators leave 
the area and hand over the project to the local community. 
Furthermore, the formalisation of the processes generates 
expectations, for instance, through the payment of per diems, 
which questions the motivations for attending and participa-
ting in negotiations.16 
International actors
The role of international organisations such as the UN has 
been important in some contexts, including in Afghanistan, 
CAR, and Kenya, but can push at the limit of when the UN is 
authorised to intervene (which under Charter is determined 
by concepts of the scale of the threat of the conflict to ‘inter-
national peace’). International intervention more generally, as 
noted, can be double-edged, especially in how it is perceived 
by stakeholders in local peace negotiations. In many loca-
tions, resentments towards international actors exist, often 
as a consequence of perceived self-interest, or because of 
the adverse effects that their involvement at local grassroots 
peace agreements has caused. 
As with the involvement of national actors in local peacema-
king, the reasons for international actors to engage in local 
conflicts are frequently questioned by stakeholders at the local 
level. For instance, in Libya, the involvement of several inter-
national players like Qatar, Italy, and the United Arab Emirates, 
frequently raises questions as to whether their involvement 
focuses on conflict resolution or on pursuing self-interest, 
and raises a level of international competition. In Syria, as 
well, the involvement of many geopolitical players in the bro-
kerage of subnational and local agreements has contributed 
to considerable suspicion.
The acknowledgement of customary conflict management 
practices and traditions, therefore, is one of the main demands 
that local actors raise when debating the role of international 
involvement and support. Local guidance and local ownership 
of the processes are seen as essential, but training needs and 
the requirement of support is widely accepted. Amplifying the 
voices and representation of marginalised and victims of the 
conflict is another responsibility that international actors are 
expected to take.
The majority of mediators come from the region under con-
cern – in contrast to conflicts at the national level where ex-
ternal mediators from other parts of the world are frequently 
involved. Where international actors are involved, they often 
cooperate with traditional local mediators such as elders or 
religious or tribal leaders. Mediators can also come from a 
variety of unexpected backgrounds. Doctors and teachers were 
involved in an internationally supported network of facilitators 
in Syria. In the Ogaden conflict in Ethiopia, ministers from 
Kenya and Ethiopia worked as mediators. 
In an increasing number of conflict contexts, for example in 
Syria and South Sudan, humanitarian actors take on the role 
of mediators. In Syria, the ceasefire in Homs in 2015 was 
negotiated by UN agencies.17 In the Abyei region, contested 
between Sudan and South Sudan, the annual negotiations 
about grazing rights and migration routes between Misse-
riya and Ngok-Dinka communities are facilitated by the UN 
peacekeeping mission and the UN Food and Agricultural Or-
ganization (FAO). In recent years, specialised agencies such 
as the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue have developed the 
capacity to support such processes globally.
International support is an important funding source for many 
negotiation processes at the local level. International actors 
also offer mediation expertise. Besides funding, the promotion 
of international norms also plays a crucial role when external 
actors get involved. INGOs and international organisations 
are influential voices advocating for and safeguarding human 
rights and gender-related rights. In a post-ISIL Iraq, such 
promotion of international rights and the need for compliance 
with international rights catalogues have created tensions for 
international actors when engaging in local peace processes 
involving groups deemed as ‘extremist’. Similar issues occur 
in Afghanistan or Syria. In the Syrian context, such critiques 
have also raised problematic implications of international 
involvement in local peace negotiations, especially where 
international organisations have been criticised for facilita-
ting humanitarian evacuation agreements that are viewed as 
supporting forced displacement.18 
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To what extent and in what ways local peace agreements can – 
or cannot – contribute to a peace process at the national level 
is a question often raised, especially by international mediators 
and observers. The case studies discussed so far show that local 
conflict settings are intertwined with national and international 
conflicts in different kind of ways. The major elements connec-
ting the local and the national level that appear across contexts 
are the recruitment activities by armed actors at the local level, 
the provision and availability of weapons, and the occurrence of 
break-away factions from parties to a national-level peace deal 
that localise their activities. 
There is also the potential of severe political repercussions 
since local conflict fault lines might trickle up and align 
with the conflict at the national level, possibly leading to an 
exacerbation of preexisting ethnopolitical tensions.
Local peace processes can supplement, substitute or un-
dermine peacemaking efforts at the national level. One 
challenging aspect frequently occurring is that they might 
offer national governments a ‘cheap’ alternative to negotia-
tions and power-sharing compromises at the national level. 
Syria is one case in point where such concerns repeatedly 
have been raised. Local ceasefires brokered in the early 
stages of the conflict, like the 2015 Homs ceasefire, mainly 
focussed on humanitarian issues. Later local agreements, 
in contrast, tended to project national interests at the local 
level and thus supported the interests of the repressive re-
gime by enabling it to avoid any political engagement with 
the armed opposition.
The adverse effects of local peace agreements can also be 
indirect. In Yemen, some local agreements were reached 
through back-channel negotiations involving al-Qaeda. These 
agreements were mainly closed based on territorial consi-
derations. They facilitated the relocation of al-Qaeda forces, 
which resulted in the transfer of the armed fighting from 
one location to another. Such a relocation of conflict, in turn, 
compromised peace initiatives ongoing at the national level. In 
Libya, the existence of a national peace process at first facili-
tated negotiations at the local level. The international support 
to General Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi conditioned his response 
to the UN’s efforts to resolve the national conflict. But as the 
support relieved him from the necessity to negotiate a local 
agreement in Benghazi, it arguably reduced his incentive to 
support an agreement at the national level as well.
Other conflicts develop in a predominantly localised way and 
are often disconnected from the national-level fault lines. In 
Afghanistan, armed actors exploit these fault lines while ne-
gotiations at the national level, such as the recent US-Taliban 
negotiations, cannot provide sustainable offers for resolving the 
existing tensions. This unfortunate constellation runs the risk 
that after a withdrawal agreement between the United States 
and the Taliban is signed, some of these local conflicts could 
worsen and provide a significant challenge to an already fragile 
ceasefire.19 
Other local agreements are a direct result of national-level 
processes. In Myanmar, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 
(NCA) between the government and ten armed opposition groups 
effectively was a localised process of peacemaking that was 
formalised at the central level. A similar localisation of national 
peacemaking was undertaken in Nepal. In the aftermath of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006 between the govern-
ment and the Maoist armed opposition, 20 agreements with 
small armed groups were closed to attach them to the national 
ceasefire process. These agreements were signed over a long 
period ranging from July 2007 to May 2010. Many had similar 
characteristics, usually including only short stipulations effec-
tuating a ceasefire and agreeing to enter conversations on poli-
tical issues in another format. The agreements were signed for 
the Nepalese state by the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction.20 
DRC and Somalia both offer examples of the complex hybridity of 
conflicts that conjunct international, local and, often to a minor 
extent, national dimensions in localised negotiation settings. 
The negotiations at the community and clan level have to take 
all those interests into account. In Somalia, the hierarchical clan 
dimension makes local peacemaking even more complicated, 
since intra-clan issues have to be settled before any inter-clan 
negotiations can meaningfully start.
South Sudan provides another striking example for the close 
interlinkage between local and national conflict settings 
that require strong efforts for local conflict management in 
order for any national-level peace process to be successful. 
Earlier studies have shown that local peace agreements 
have a better chance of success when they are not aligned 
to the fault lines at the national level. At the same time, their 
sustainability depends on a national-level process to be suc-
cessful.  In one recent case of local peacemaking, faith-based 
actors as mediators succeeded in finding the political space 
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to negotiate for local peace between armed actors represen-
ting Dinka and Nuer communities in Unity and Lakes state, 
despite ongoing tensions at the national level. When local 
actors were ignored, peace processes failed. The experiences 
of local peacemaking in South Sudan demonstrate that no 
shortcut is available to resolving local conflict settings when 
the main actors consider themselves as being stakeholders 
in the national conflict. The acceptance of local peacemaking 
by the national level hence is an indispensable condition for 
it to be successful.21 
These insights suggest thinking about local peace agree-
ments less in the sense of a ‘scaling up’ than of a ‘scaling 
out’. Peace processes do not evolve in a linear way, either at 
the national or at the local level. A scaling out remains at the 
horizontal level and avoids vertical thinking such as in spatial 
hierarchies (from the local to the national) or with regards to 
peace process sequencing (from ceasefires to comprehensive 
peace agreements). Perhaps it is the power of imitation that 
is most powerful since limitation is connected to the afterlife 
and the legacies of local peacemaking as well as to the new 
conflicts it introduces that offer an alternative to the logics 
of war-making.
____________________________________________________
19 See also Anna Larson, ed, 2018, Incremental Peace in Afghanistan, 
Accord Issue 27, London: Conciliation Resources.
20 For full texts of peace agreements from local peace processes in Ne-
pal, see PA-X Peace Agreement Database, 2020, peaceagreements.org
21 Alan Boswell, 2019, Do local peace deals work? Evidence from South 
Sudan’s civil war, Kampala: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Uganda; Mark 
Bradbury, John Ryle, Michael Medley, and Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenid-
ge, 2006, Local Peace Processes in Sudan. A Baseline Study, London: 
Rift Valley Institute.
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Letter from Sheikh Yahya bin Ali al-Hajuri, Iman of Dar al-Hadith Institute to the Presidential 
Mediation Committee on terms for ending the conflict in Dammaj 
11 January 2014 
 
Source: Yemen Press. ‘Sheikh al-Hajuri agrees to leave Dammaj and move to Hudaydah in exchange 
for a ceasefire and the lifting of the siege’, 11 January 2014, https://yemen-
press.com/news25978.html  
Local peace agreement example
Letter from Sheikh Yahya bin Ali al-Hajuri, Iman of Dar al-Hadith Institute to the Presidential Mediation Committee on terms 
for ending the conflict in Dammaj, signed 11 January 2014
Source: Yemen Press. ‘Sheikh al-Hajuri agrees to leave Dammaj and move to Hudaydah in exchange for a ceasefire and the lifting of the siege’, 11 
January 2014, https://yemen-press.com/news25978.html
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Reaching a local agreement often is reported as the successful 
conclusion of a process, with less information publically available 
on what happens next. In many cases, local peace agreements 
are focused on a short-term perspective, which makes it difficult 
to speak of implementation in a way similar to comprehensive 
peace agreements signed at the national level. The conclusion of 
an agreement in and of itself might be the anticipated outcome 
if increased inter-communal understanding and agreement was 
itself the goal of a more extended dialogue. The inter-communal 
relationships are already established and normalised by the 
agreement rather than it forming the first step in the process 
of implementation. 
Nevertheless, facilitating the implementation of the agreed 
points and establishing mechanisms to monitor compliance 
and respond to violations is an immense amount of work for 
those party to and supporting local peace processes. As one 
participant reflected: 
reaching a peace agreement is not the end by itself. It is called 
agreement because certain things are missing, but they need to 
be implemented and followed up. That is not the end, that is the 
beginning of the work, where we find out whether what was agreed 
is going to work or not … Your work as facilitators does not finish 
when you write the report. The work is just beginning.
As with national-level peace agreements, local peace agree-
ments sometimes provide for implementation, monitoring, 
and enforcement mechanisms within the text, albeit with 
greater brevity, as implementation sections in national level 
accords can sometimes comprise extensive annexes. While 
written implementation procedures can be used by parties 
to hold others to account during the implementation phase, 
they are not always present in local agreements.
Missing details in written texts are not necessarily the re-
sult of a lack of discussion or consent. Parties may have 
agreed on channels to continue negotiating the structure or 
composition of enforcement mechanisms, or they may have 
been omitted the stipulation for strategic reasons. There 
may also be customary practices of social guarantees at 
play. In western Pakistan, for instance, agreements that are 
reached by local peace committees are considered binding, 
due to the role of social pressure. If somebody breaches the 
agreement, there is an expectation that this person would 
be punished or would lose credibility in the community, and 
risk being excluded from the community due to this breach 
of trust. 
As with mediation, the task of monitoring the implementation 
and outcomes of local peace agreements often falls to different 
actors. Trust, legitimacy, and capacity remain as crucial factors 
for effective involvement. In Nepal and CAR, the UN has played a 
role in that task, while in Somalia, Jordan, and Yemen, clans and 
tribes are encouraged to monitor progress and implementation 
of agreements. In some conflicts, local peace processes receive 
national and international assistance to support implementation 
through structures such as multi-level technical monitoring or 
joint-ceasefire committees. However, those actors do not always 
have the capacity or an appropriate mandate to respond effec-
tively to reported violations. In reported instances, committee 
members could not submit monitoring reports to the central 
coordination agencies since they could not cover their phone 
bills due to a lack of funding.
In internationalised conflicts such as in Yemen and Syria, local 
peacemakers face severe challenges to find trustworthy third 
parties. These challenges raise the issue that while third party 
involvement may be viewed as necessary for monitoring imple-
mentation, there is also the danger of competing national and 
international agendas undermining the effectiveness of the 
peace agreement. Third parties may have considerable self-in-
terests that can contradict local concerns.
Besides the issue of identifying trusted third parties to support 
local peace agreements, a successful implementation faces a 
number of additional potential limitations. First, there can be a 
limit to the sustainability of an agreement that brings an end to 
violence in a geographically confined space, when there is the 
possibility that the broader national conflict escalates in other 
areas and risks causing the collapse of the local deal through 
conflict overspill. This problem is twofold. In Syria, the successful 
maintenance of an agreement between competing armed actors 
in one area means that violence moves to other parts of the 
country, often areas more vulnerable due to high concentrations 
of IDPs that can be targeted for, or coerced into, recruitment. 
Second, there can be confusion over responsibility and expec-
tations for the post-agreement stage. In Libya, there have been 
cases where traditional actors involved in mediation negotiated 
compensations, infrastructure reconstruction or security provi-
sions that should be paid for or provided by the state. Yet, there 
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is no common understanding of how this will be done, or how 
the capacity of the weak or non-existent central state can be 
enhanced to deliver. The lack of understanding results in gaps 
between the text of the local agreement and the reality of a state 
that does not exist in these areas. 
Firm commitments to implement according to agreed time-
scales may not always be the most appropriate approach since 
they depend on the evolvement of a broader political settlement. 
In one instance in Libya, the implementation of a local agree-
ment between two tribes had to be stopped after it emerged 
that both desired a pipeline to cross over their lands in order to 
collect transit fees. This dispute required them to reach a new 
agreement concerning the route of the pipeline. For solving 
the financial issue, a compensation deal was negotiated. The 
pipeline ran through the area of one tribe, which got the transit 
fees, while the other tribe was given a maintenance contract.
The diversity of enforcement mechanisms within local peace 
agreements raise potential tensions between international 
norms and accepted conflict resolution practices within com-
munities, which may make it difficult for international actors 
to support implementation. In several contexts, extra-judicial 
killings or forced displacement are used as a form of enforce-
ment mechanism to prevent violations of agreements. Such 
practices can also function as dispute-resolution mechanisms 
if an agreement is perceived within a community as not being 
effective enough, or not delivering the expected justice to con-
flict victims. Other traditional implementation practices involve 
arranged marriages as a form of compensation between com-
munities, which may cause difficulties for external organisations 
to support such a process.
In the Philippines, the tension at times has been between donor 
expectations of peace processes and the pragmatic realities on 
the ground. Some of the peace agreements in Mindanao have 
been perceived by local actors as overemphasising ‘Western’ 
values at the expense of adequately addressing the needs of 
demobilised ex-combatants. They were then followed by a surge 
of the informal arms economy.
Implementing the terms of a humanitarian evacuation agree-
ment suspected of being used as a conduit for forced displa-
cement, particularly from areas under siege, as well can cause 
enormous challenges for international organisations named 
as responsible for facilitating evacuations. These organisati-
ons need to fulfil humanitarian obligations but risk furthering 
the conflict agendas of dominant parties, such as in Syria and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Local peace processes are therefore not necessarily disruptive 
of the logic and narrative of conflict. Sometimes, they become 
part of the conflict system and are reinforcing and becoming 
part of the conflict tapestry. The empirical insights reveal that 
local peace agreements, and local peacemaking in general, 
must not be romanticised. Their potential embeddedness in a 
conflict system poses a massive challenge to external actors 
wishing to engage with these processes.
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External support for local peacemaking mainly takes the form 
of funding, practical support, such as capacity building, or direct 
involvement, either as a mediator or as a trusted party in super-
vising or monitoring a peace agreement and its implementation.
The known issues about funding are the timescales of fun-
ding cycles and unforeseeable peace process sequences. The 
discrepancies concern local peace agreements, in particular 
since they are often short-term oriented, ad-hoc and oppor-
tunity-driven. For them to happen and succeed, flexibility, pa-
tience, brevity and persistent interactions at various levels are 
necessary preconditions. These conditions are difficult to meet 
especially for development actors, who work with longer timeli-
nes and planning cycles. Humanitarian actors, in general, have 
more flexibility for immediate support but are more cautious 
regarding supporting local agreements that could be perceived 
as political rather than humanitarian, which would potentially 
contradict the humanitarian principles.
As discussed previously, structural funding for actors engaging 
in such processes is a double-edged sword. Organisational 
funding, for instance, for civil society and faith-based orga-
nisations, is widely undisputed. Yet, effective involvement in 
local peacemaking often relies on the personal capacity of 
individuals. Furthermore, normative funding criteria can make 
it challenging to support processes that involve actors which 
do not meet the required standards or are even explicitly exclu-
ded from funding. Other previously raised issues concern the 
possible undermining of ownership and legitimacy, which both 
are critical ingredients for the success of local peacemaking. 
Moreover, the import of ‘Western’ concepts and institutions 
without an adequate understanding or awareness of local 
understandings of peace or conflict resolution mechanisms is 
still raised as being a challenge.
In the implementation of external support, frequent challenges 
arise because of language and educational issues that often 
hamper the required levels of inclusivity and representation. 
Another practical problem is the available infrastructure. Safe 
places to meet and the travel between locations can provide 
challenges that are hard to overcome. Funding alone is not 
sufficient to address these problems, especially since funding 
modalities may provide difficulties within themselves like, for 
example, the transfer of money into remote localities without 
a functioning banking or transfer system.
The involvement of external actors has severe implications on 
the negotiation of local peace agreements. It might undermi-
ne the legitimacy of local peacemaking, affect a given power 
constellation, and add another layer of complexity to an often 
already complex and hybrid balance between the involved ac-
tors. However, it is often the structural role of external actors 
to support local peacemaking by raising issues required for 
a sustainable, longer-term perspective, such as transitional 
justice, trauma healing or systemic issues driving a conflict. 
The inclusion of these issues requires careful navigation since 
it is sometimes the simplicity of local peace agreements that 
is an indispensable ingredient of their success.
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The two Joint Analysis Workshops have shown that local peace 
agreements are an issue of increasing relevance in contempo-
rary peacemaking. They occur in virtually all conflict contexts 
globally and, despite all divergence due to their predominantly 
contextualised character, share similarities that allow to legi-
timately speak of them as a particular phenomenon. 
Local peace agreements can, therefore, be understood as a 
globalised practice. Their negotiation occurs in a constant 
tension between preexisting traditions of local conflict ma-
nagement and the prolongation of the armed conflict and 
efforts of peacemaking at the national level. Agreements often 
lean towards one of these two poles, some processes, such 
as the efforts to mitigate the post-election violence in Kenya, 
evolve in a combination of both elements.
The relationship of local peace agreements to the national 
and the international level is complex and context-dependent, 
which makes it difficult to identify cross-regional patterns. One 
critical aspect of global relevance is their increasingly written 
character, which has significant implications on contemporary 
practices of peacemaking. There is a difference between a 
local peace gathering that has a two-page written outcome 
document that is signed by all stakeholders and one that has 
not. Many of the local peace agreements available in writing, 
thus, show formal similarities to national-level peace deals. 
Nonetheless, they generally avoid engaging with the fault lines 
of the ‘bigger’ conflict at the national or regional level. Their 
implementation differs as well – often, implementation relies 
on traditional legitimacy structures and cannot be assessed in 
formal legal terms. Therefore, a direct comparison of ‘success’ 
is not feasible.
The role of external actors is diverse and contested. De-
mands of keeping external actors out of peace negotiations 
at the local level are often contrasted with calls for external 
recognition and technical or financial support. In virtually all 
conflict settings, the negotiation of local peace agreements is 
a hybrid and ‘glocalised’ undertaking incorporating internatio-
nal, regional, national and local elements. While international 
support certainly has the potential to spoil such processes, it 
can as well play a useful role. The acceptance of remaining 
in a learning position that recognises and acknowledges the 
local approaches to peacemaking is a precondition required 
for achieving such a useful role.
In terms of impacting the broader conflict dynamics, local 
peace agreements have three specific dimensions that need 
to be kept in mind when engaging with them. First, it is crucial 
to keep in mind that local peace agreements cannot succeed 
where negotiations at the national level fail. They can even 
weaken motivations and incentives for power-sharing deals 
and provide pathways for contested regimes to sustain their 
rule. Armed non-state actors engage in such processes based 
on their strategic political interests. As in peace negotiations 
at the national level, parties continue aiming to reach their 
goals through peace talks. The negotiation of local peace ag-
reements is undoubtedly not a power- and interest-free zone, 
but one which will reconfigure power relationships.
Second, local peace agreements may undermine and, in some 
instances, even disrupt ongoing armed conflicts in ways that 
build confidence for wider peacemaking efforts. They can 
either create small islands of peace influencing the conflict’s 
territorial dimension and can undermine recruitment and 
funding patterns or help to prevent the ‘triggering up’ of local 
conflict reasonings into aligning with national-level fault lines. 
In doing so, local peace agreements can be able to support 
a shift in logics – from logics that support conflict towards 
logics that support peace such as, in Mary Kaldor’s words, 
‘civicness’.22  In such a way, they may indeed be able to impact 
the broader conflict setting by opening up a viable alternative 
to armed fighting.
Third, local peace agreements still remain a largely unchar-
tered territory, given how many are not documented and how 
little has been studied about their outcomes. Yet, they often 
tell a new and different story of the wider in-country conflict 
dynamics. They provide a glimpse into what might be local 
agendas for peace and the management of conflicts, local 
forms of deliberation over power-relations, and how civilian 
and military actors come to an agreement. In the broader con-
flict landscape, local peace agreements point to the complexity 
of nested intertwined conflicts that is often eliminated by the 
more simple stories that peace processes tell of ‘the’ conflict 
which will be resolved by national-level elite pacts. 
____________________________________________________
22 Mary Kaldor, 2019, ‘The phenomenon of civicness and researching 
its advancement’, LSE CRP blog, 22 May 2019, available at https://
blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2019/05/22/kaldor-civicness/
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The Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP) is 
centrally concerned with how political settlements can be 
made both more stable, and more inclusive of those affected 
by them beyond political elites. In particular, the programme 
examines the relationship between stability and inclusion, 
sometimes understood as a relationship between peace-ma-
king and justice. 
The programme is addressing three broad research questions 
relating to political settlements: 
1. How do different types of political settlements emerge, and 
what are the actors, institutions, resources, and practices that 
shape them? 
2. How can political settlements be improved by internal-
ly-driven initiatives, including the impact of gender-inclusive 
processes and the rule of law institutions? 
3. How, and with what interventions, can external actors 
change political settlements? 
The University of Edinburgh is the lead organisation. PSRP 
partners include: Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Resolution (ASPR), Conciliation Resources (CR), International 
IDEA, The Institute for Security Studies (ISS), The Rift Valley 
Institute (RVI), and the Transitional Justice Institute (TJI, Ulster 
University). 
Find out more at: www.politicalsettlements.org
ABOUT US
27
Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)
Rochusplatz 1, 7461 Stadtschlaining, Austria
Phone: +43 3355 2498, Fax: +43 3355 2662, E-Mail: aspr@aspr.ac.at
www.aspr.ac.at |  ASPR_Schlaining |  ASPR.Schlaining
